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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role of government 
wages in ensuring macroeconomic stability 
and competitiveness in the euro area. Recent 
empirical evidence suggests that government 
wage expenditure is subject to a pro-cyclical bias 
in most euro area countries and at the euro area 
aggregate level. Moreover, the evidence points 
to a strong positive correlation and co-movement 
between public and private wages in the short to 
medium term, both directly and indirectly via 
the price level, in most euro area countries. In a 
number of countries this interrelation between 
public and private wages coincided with strong 
public wage growth and competitiveness losses. 
These  ﬁ  ndings underpin the need for prudent 
public wage policies supported by strong 
domestic  ﬁ   scal frameworks and appropriate 
wage-setting institutions in order to enhance 
economic stability and competitiveness in 
Economic and Monetary Union.
Keywords: government wage expenditure, ﬁ  scal 
cyclicality, competitiveness
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: E62; E63; J45; H11; H505
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This paper studies the role of government 
wages as a determinant of macroeconomic 
stability and competitiveness in the euro area. 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that real 
government wage expenditure is subject to a 
pro-cyclical bias, i.e. it co-moves positively with 
the business cycle in most euro area countries 
and at the euro area aggregate level. Thus, it 
might reinforce rather than mitigate ﬂ  uctuations 
in economic activity. Moreover, the evidence 
points to a strong, positive correlation and 
co-movement between public and private wages 
in the short to medium term, both directly and 
indirectly via the price level. In a number of 
countries this interrelation has coincided with 
strong public wage growth and intra-euro area 
competitiveness losses.
These ﬁ  ndings suggest that governments should 
be cautious that wage-setting and employment 
policies do not lead to negative repercussions 
on  ﬁ   scal and economic performance. First, 
there appears to be a need to strengthen 
ﬁ   scal discipline and to reduce the risk of 
pro-cyclicality in government wage expenditure. 
To this end, strict domestic ﬁ   scal rules and 
medium-term budgetary frameworks could be 
effective tools to constrain the volatility and 
pro-cyclicality of this spending item. In addition, 
reforms to labour market institutions may be 
needed to avoid institutional biases towards 
pro-cyclicality, e.g. originating from indexation, 
which ties government wages to inﬂ  ation.
Second, given the interrelation between 
government and private sector wage 
developments, policy-makers would be 
well-advised to adopt a prudent approach to 
government sector wage setting to mitigate the 
risk of competitiveness losses in the private 
sector. While the speciﬁ  c reform needs differ 
across countries, a strengthening of ﬁ  scal 
institutions is likely to facilitate such prudence. 
Reforms in labour market institutions, for 
instance towards less coordinated wage 
bargaining and more decentralised wage setting, 
as well as product market liberalisation, may 
further reduce the risk of adverse government 
wage spillovers and also facilitate wage 
adjustment in the private sector.
The implementation of such reforms may 
well be associated with political opposition. 
However, the “double dividend” of greater 
economic stability and a lower risk of intra-euro 
area competitiveness losses should encourage 
policy-makers to undertake the necessary 
adjustments.6
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1 INTRODUCTION
In view of the sharp deterioration in public 
ﬁ  nances triggered by the ﬁ  nancial and economic 
crisis,  ﬁ   scal policy in EU Member States 
will encounter considerable challenges in the 
years to come. Moreover, disequilibria within 
the euro area, as manifest in unit labour cost 
divergence and current account imbalances, will 
further complicate the economic environment 
policy-makers are facing.
In this context, public wages 1 play an important 
role. First, the public wage bill typically 
accounts for a substantial fraction of overall 
government spending. In the euro area, 
compensation of government employees on 
average amounted to almost a quarter of all 
general government expenditure over the last 
decade. Owing to this quantitative prominence, 
the public wage bill is a crucial determinant of 
ﬁ  scal performance. Second, certain qualitative 
features of public wage expenditure can exert 
important feedback effects on a country’s 
macroeconomic performance: the forces shaping 
public wage setting and employment may 
reinforce rather than stabilise ﬂ  uctuations  in 
output. Moreover, since the government 
competes with ﬁ  rms in the labour market, public 
and private wage setting is likely to be 
interdependent. Thus, public wage setting may 
affect a country’s cost competitiveness.
Drawing on related research, this Occasional 
Paper examines the implications of public 
wages for these two aspects of macroeconomic 
performance in Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). Regarding the stabilising role of public 
spending, it reports evidence that government 
wage expenditure has typically been subject 
to a pro-cyclical spending bias. In particular, 
both real compensation of public employees 
and its subcomponents, real compensation per 
public employee and (to a lesser extent) public 
employment, co-move with the business cycle in 
a pro-cyclical manner at the euro area aggregate 
and in most euro area countries.
These results underpin the need to strengthen 
budgetary discipline by implementing strict 
domestic  ﬁ   scal frameworks that effectively 
constrain the volatility and cyclicality of 
government expenditure, in general, and the 
public wage bill, in particular. In addition, 
reforms in labour market institutions may be 
needed to avoid institutional biases towards 
pro-cyclicality, e.g. originating from indexation, 
which ties government wages to inﬂ  ation. 
While these conclusions are of general interest 
for economic policy, they are particularly 
relevant in a monetary union: the delegation of 
monetary policy to a single central bank implies 
that macroeconomic adjustment at the national 
level can only be achieved in the ﬁ  scal domain 
and via structural reform.
As regards labour market interactions, the paper 
reports evidence of a robust and signiﬁ  cant 
inter-relation between public and private wages. 
In particular, in most euro area countries and 
at the euro area aggregate, public and private 
wages tend to co-move both in the short and 
the long run. Moreover, the empirical results 
provide some evidence of a direct causal 
relationship between these variables. While 
private wages tend to lead public wages 
in the very long run, for some countries 
bi-directional causality (i.e. running from public 
to private wages and vice versa) is found for the 
medium and short run. In addition, the evidence 
documents second-round effects, since public 
and private sector wages inﬂ  uence each other 
indirectly via the price level in most countries. 
Cross-country differences in the degree of 
public wage spillovers may be partly explained 
by differences in domestic labour and product 
market institutions.
This evidence on public-private wage 
interrelation suggests that generous public wage 
For expositional ease, the terms “government” and “public” are  1 
used interchangeably throughout the paper. In both cases the text 
refers to the deﬁ  nition of the “government sector” adopted by the 
OECD as opposed to the broader concept of the “public sector”. 
For more information see the data appendix.7
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I   INTRODUCTION
setting may put pressure on private wages, 
with potentially adverse effects on a country’s 
intra-euro area competitiveness. In fact, several 
countries with strong public-private wage 
interaction have been experiencing sharp unit 
labour cost growth and public wage increases 
since the start of EMU. To mitigate the risk of 
competitiveness losses, public wage restraint 
emerges as one important policy implication. 
While the speciﬁ  c reform needs differ across 
countries, a strengthening of ﬁ  scal institutions 
could generally facilitate the implementation 
of such policies. Reforms of labour market 
institutions leading to less coordinated wage 
bargaining and more decentralised wage 
setting, as well as product market liberalisation, 
may reduce adverse public wage spillovers 
and facilitate wage adjustment also in the 
private sector.
Tackling these challenges is particularly crucial 
in a monetary union: the single monetary policy 
implies that it is even more difﬁ  cult to respond 
to wage spillovers across sectors of an economy, 
which leads to wage costs growing faster than 
warranted by fundamentals and adversely 
affects intra-euro area cost competitiveness. 
Moreover, evidence on the transmission of 
wage increases via inﬂ  ation conﬁ  rms the risk 
of second-round effects and wage-price spirals. 
Therefore, generous public sector wage setting 
may, notably, give rise to divergent price 
developments across Member States but also 
raise inﬂ  ation in the area as a whole.
Countries adopting appropriate policies and 
institutions to underpin public wage restraint, 
especially in upturns, and to reduce undue 
public-private wage spillovers could reap the 
beneﬁ   t of a more competitive private sector 
and a more appropriate ﬁ  scal stance over the 
business cycle. This “double dividend” of 
greater economic stability and a lower risk of 
intra-euro area competitiveness losses should 
encourage policy-makers to undertake the 
necessary adjustments.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
provides stylised facts on public wage 
expenditure and public wage and employment 
dynamics. Section 3 examines the cyclicality 
of government wage expenditure and discusses 
implications for macroeconomic stabilisation. 
Section 4 focuses on the interaction between 
public and private sector wages and addresses 
implications for economic competitiveness. 
Section 5 concludes.8
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2  STYLISED FACTS ON PUBLIC WAGE 
EXPENDITURE AND WAGE DYNAMICS 
IN THE EURO AREA
2.1  THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC 
WAGES
The government wage bill accounts, on average, 
for almost a quarter of total public spending in 
the euro area (see Chart 1).2 However, this ﬁ  gure 
is subject to substantial cross-country variation. 
Some countries such as Austria and Germany 
record ratios well below average, while others 
such as Portugal, Ireland and Finland almost 
reach 30%.
Given that nearly half of GDP goes through 
the hands of government, this also implies that 
public wage expenditure plays an important 
role in aggregate demand. In the euro area, the 
government wage bill accounts, on average, for 
more than 10% of GDP. Here, too, substantial 
cross-country variation may be observed 
(see Chart 1). For example, in Germany 
government wage expenditure of about 7% of 
GDP amounts to slightly more than one-half 
of the corresponding ratio in France, Portugal 
and Finland.
These ﬁ  gures also reﬂ  ect the importance of the 
government as an employer: on average, almost 
15% of the labour force in the euro area is 
employed by the public sector (see Chart 2). 
While a relatively small public workforce can 
be found in Germany, with less than 10% of the 
overall labour force, in France and Finland this 
share is more than twice as high.3
A comparison of public wage expenditure in the 
ﬁ  rst half of the 1990s and in more recent years 
reveals some interesting patterns. The public 
wage bill has generally gained in importance 
relative to overall government spending. 
In particular, only Germany and Austria 
achieved a notable reduction in the ratio of 
the government wage bill to government 
expenditure (see Chart 3). By contrast, most 
countries, with the exceptions of Belgium, 
For data sources and variable deﬁ   nitions see the Appendix.  2 
Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia are not 
included in the sample owing to a lack of data for these countries. 
It should be noted that the euro area average included in Charts 1 
to 4 refers to the simple average (rather than a weighted average), 
since this analysis is mainly concerned with the comparison 
of a country’s policies to “typical” (i.e. average) behaviour of 
governments in the euro area. In Charts 6 to 12 and Tables 1 and 
2 in Section 2.2, weighted averages are used because the focus is 
on the overall development of the respective variable in the euro 
area as one economic entity.
Public employment ﬁ  gures should be interpreted with caution.  3 
First, the delineation of public and private employment is very 
complex and, consequently, country ﬁ   gures are not always 
fully comparable. Second, for some countries, data had to be 
imputed due to a lack of data availability. Third, institutional 
reclassiﬁ   cation of certain organisations between the public 
and private sector can in some cases lead to marked variations 
between years. For a description see the appendix.
Chart 1 Government wage bill
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as a percentage of government expenditure
as a percentage of GDP
Source: OECD.
Chart 2 Government employment 
as a percentage of the labour force
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Greece and Portugal, reduced government wage 
expenditure relative to GDP (see Chart 4). Thus, 
while governments were generally able to scale 
down the public sector relative to the overall size 
of the economy, the adjustment burden borne by 
public employees was often smaller than that 
borne by other types of spending.
Given its size, the government wage bill is a key 
ingredient in a country’s ﬁ  scal stance. As a ﬁ  rst 
step in exploring its cyclical patterns, Chart 5 
plots annual growth in government wage 
expenditure against the output gap for the 
period 1999-2008. A positive relationship 
between the change in the government wage bill 
and the output gap can be detected. This implies 
that the growth in public wage expenditure 
tended to be stronger in times of favourable 
economic conditions.4 Of course, the causal 
interpretation of this observation should not be 
over-emphasised. However, it may be viewed as 
suggestive evidence of a pro-cyclical, rather 
than stabilising, role of public wage expenditure. 
This  ﬁ  nding will be discussed in more detail 
in Section 3.
The relative scaling of the axes in Chart 5 may partly conceal the  4 
relationship between the two variables, since the range of values 
on the y-axis greatly exceeds the range of values on the x-axis. 
The slope of the regression line indicates that an increase of 
1 percentage point in the output gap was, on average, associated 
with an increase of approximately 0.8 percentage point in the 
growth rate of the public wage bill. However, as evident from 
the low value of the R-squared statistic, the explanatory power 
of the regression is rather limited, i.e. variation in the output gap 
only explains around 9% of the variation in the growth rate of the 
public wage bill.
Chart 3 Public sector wage bill as a percentage 
of general government expenditure



































Chart 4 Public sector wage bill as a percentage 
of GDP







































Chart 5 Annual growth in the public sector 
wage bill and cyclical conditions 
in individual euro area countries
(1999-2008)
y = 0.84x + 4.55
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x-axis: output gap
y-axis: annual growth rate of public wage bill 
Sources: OECD and own calculations.10
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2.2  PUBLIC WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EURO AREA
A comparison of public and private sector 
wages for the euro area as a whole reveals 
that the average public wage has always been 
noticeably higher than the average private wage 
(see Chart 6). This is consistent with the notion 
of the public sector wage premium that is 
generally found in developed economies.5
The ratio of euro area public to private wages 
per employee fell during the 1970s and 1980s, 
as nominal wages in the private sector tended 
to grow at a faster pace than in the public 
sector (see Chart 7). Public wages per employee 
were one-third higher than private wages 
in 1970 (see Chart 6), but the ratio fell to just 
above 1.1 by 1989. Since 1989, the downward 
trend in this ratio has reversed decisively.
Since the beginning of EMU, among the euro 
area countries included in the sample two 
groups can broadly be distinguished. The ﬁ  rst 
group, comprising Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
Italy and Portugal, has seen signiﬁ  cantly faster 
public wage growth than private wage growth, 
(see Chart 8a), and to a greater extent than for 
the euro area aggregate. This goes some way 
to explaining the rise in the euro area ratio. 
Ireland has seen the largest increase since the 
start of  EMU (31%). By contrast, the second 
group, consisting of Belgium, Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, Austria and Finland, has seen 
relatively little change in the ratio since 1999 
(see Chart 8b).
The downward trends in public and private 
sector wage growth, as well as their volatility, 
are also striking (see Chart 7).6 These patterns 
are displayed for the euro area countries and 
different time periods in Table 1. The period 
after 1992 saw relatively low and stable wage 
growth. This is likely to be due to the benign, 
low-inﬂ  ation economic environment following 
The two most common explanations for the public sector wage  5 
premium are: a) differences in the productive characteristics of 
workers; b) economic rents accruing to government workers from 
political and “vote producing” activities that are not relevant in 
the private sector (see Bender (2003)).
The trends in public and private sector wage growth broadly  6 
follow trends in inﬂ   ation, which are shown for the private 
consumption deﬂ  ator in Chart 7. In this case the deﬂ  ator is used 
as a measure of inﬂ  ation, but it is also used in Section 4 to deﬂ  ate 
nominal wages per employee.













Maastricht treaty start of EMU
1970 1980 1990 2000
Source: OECD. Last observation: 2008.











growth in public sector wages per employee
growth in private sector wages per employee
growth in private consumption deflator
1970 1980 1990 2000
Source: OECD. Last observation: 2008.11
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the start of the convergence period leading 
to EMU.7 
The standard deviation of public wage growth, 
especially since the start of EMU, has been 
larger than that of private wage growth in 
several euro area countries. Ireland, Spain, 
Italy and Portugal (as well as Austria) again 
stand out as having particularly volatile public 
wage growth relative to the private sector. 
See, for example, Stock and Watson (2002), who show that  7 
ﬂ  uctuations in wages have moderated considerably in the United 
States since 1984. In fact, OECD data reveal that the reduction 
in the average and standard deviation of wage growth in both the 
public and private sectors in the United States has been much 
less pronounced than in the euro area.












































Source: OECD. Last observation: 2008.
Table 1 Average and standard deviation of annual growth in wages per employee
Whole sample 1971-2008 Post-Maastricht 1992-2008 EMU 1999-2008
Average St dev Average St dev Average St dev
Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private
Euro area 5.8 5.8 3.2 3.8 3.4 2.6 1.0 1.4 3.0 2.2 0.5 0.4
Belgium 4.2 3.8 2.9 2.1 3.8 2.7 1.7 1.3 3.2 2.8 1.1 1.0
Germany 3.8 4.3 3.6 3.3 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.4 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.0
Ireland 10.8 9.4 6.5 6.9 7.1 4.7 2.8 1.7 7.8 4.8 3.1 1.6
Greece 14.2 13.8 7.1 7.4 9.1 7.2 4.5 4.0 7.7 5.0 3.1 3.2
Spain 8.7 10.0 6.7 7.4 4.2 3.7 3.4 2.4 4.4 2.7 2.2 0.8
France 6.9 6.7 5.4 5.2 3.1 2.4 0.7 0.9 2.8 2.9 0.6 0.6
Italy 9.8 9.5 7.4 7.6 3.6 2.9 2.6 1.6 3.6 2.2 1.1 0.5
Netherlands 4.4 5.0 4.0 4.9 3.6 3.1 1.4 1.3 3.3 3.4 0.8 1.2
Austria 5.4 5.4 3.1 3.7 3.2 2.6 2.4 1.1 2.6 2.4 1.8 0.5
Portugal 13.4 13.2 8.9 9.4 6.3 4.9 4.3 3.6 4.8 3.1 4.1 1.1
Finland 7.2 8.3 5.2 6.1 2.9 3.3 1.6 1.2 3.6 3.3 1.1 1.1
United Kingdom 9.7 8.4 6.7 6.1 5.0 4.0 2.0 1.4 5.2 4.0 1.0 1.2
United States 5.1 5.2 2.2 2.2 3.6 3.8 1.3 1.4 4.4 3.9 1.1 1.212
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Furthermore, despite overall lower wage growth, 
a number of euro area countries have recorded 
public wage growth far in excess of both 
domestic private wage growth and the average 
public wage growth in the euro area. Again, 
Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal are 
prominent examples. In most of these countries, 
private wage growth has also been much higher 
than the euro area average. Overall, public wage 
growth seems to have become more volatile and 
dynamic compared with wage growth in the 
private sector since the start of EMU, at the euro 
area level and notably in a few of its members. 
While this is only illustrative evidence, a 
more in-depth discussion will follow in the 
coming sections.
The public to private wage ratio tends to be 
greater in countries with a smaller share of their 
workforce in the public sector (see Chart 9). 
At one extreme are the relatively large but 
(compared with their private sectors) low-paid 
French and Finnish public sector workforces. 
At the other extreme lies the Netherlands, with 
its relatively small and (relative to its private 
sector) very well-paid public sector workforce.
It is also worth brieﬂ   y reviewing public 
employment trends (see Chart 10).8 Public 
employment grew strongly until the mid-1980s; 
by contrast, private employment was very 
volatile and grew much less overall. After 1987, 
however, public employment grew more slowly 
(and again in a less volatile manner) than private 
employment, with the exception of the years 
1992-93 and 2002-03 (periods of economic 
weakness, during which the private sector is, 
naturally, more affected).
Chart 10 shows public employment as a share of total  8 
employment, whereas Chart 2 expresses public employment as 
a fraction of the labour force (which also includes unemployed 
persons). This distinction is made since the focus of each 
chart differs: Chart 2 illustrates the portion of a country’s 
labour input that is devoted to its public sector, which is more 
accurately captured by the labour force. By contrast, Chart 10 
compares employment and wage trends, and since wage data for 
unemployed persons are not available, total employment is the 
more accurate point of reference.
Chart 9 Ratio of public to private wages 
per employee and the share of public 
employment in 2008






















x-axis: ratio of public to private wages per employee










0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6
Source: OECD. 
Notes: Data for Ireland, Greece and Spain are not included due 
to signiﬁ  cant differences in the deﬁ  nition of public employment. 
These differences affect the calculation of the level of public 
employment, although they do not affect the calculation of 
growth rates to the same extent.
Chart 10 Annual growth rates of public and 
private employment and the share of public 























growth in public employment (left-hand scale)
growth in private sector employment (left-hand scale)
public employment as a share of total employment
(right-hand scale)
1970 1980 1990
Source: OECD. Last observation: 2008.13
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Chart 11 gives a country-by-country breakdown 
of the average annual growth in public and 
private sector wage bills during the post-EMU 
period into its “price” (compensation 
per employee) and “quantity” (employment) 
components. It allows for a comparison of 
developments in the wage bill across component, 
country and sector. Several messages can be 
taken from this chart:
In the euro area as a whole, public wages  a) 
per employee grew faster than those in the 
private sector in the post-EMU period. 
However, the total public wage bill rose 
more slowly. This reﬂ   ects more subdued 
public (than private) employment growth.
Two out of the three countries with the  b) 
highest average growth in public sector 
wages per employee (Spain and Ireland) also 
experienced the strongest public employment 
growth of all the euro area countries.
In Greece, Italy and Portugal, public wages  c) 
per employee also grew rapidly over the 
decade. However, these countries saw 
modest employment growth (a slight fall in 
employment in the case of Portugal), limiting 
the increase in their public wage bill.
Germany and Austria restricted growth in  d) 
their public wage bill much more successfully 
than all the other countries, in the dimension 
of both employment and wages per 
employee. Public employment fell in both 
countries over this period;9 they also reported 
the smallest average increases in public 
wages per employee.
The employment dynamics in the two countries are somewhat  9 
different. German public employment shrank every year since the 
start of EMU (indeed, since 1993), while Austrian employment 
developed more unevenly.
Chart 11 Average annual growth in public 
























public wages per employee
private wage bill
private employment
private wages per employee
BE DE IE GR ES FR IT NL AT PT
Source: OECD.
Chart 12 Cumulative growth of public sector 

























x-axis: public sector wages per employee (percentage growth 
in nominal terms)












0 20 40 60 80 100
Sources: OECD and Eurostat. 
*Data for Greece begin in 2001. Developments of labour 
productivity in Greece are strongly affected by the structural 
decline of self-employed persons in the agricultural sector. 
Looking at dependent employment, the cumulated unit labour 
cost growth between 1999 and 2008 amounted to 45.0%.14
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Public wage setting can potentially have 
an important effect on a country’s cost 
competitiveness through its effects on private 
wage setting. A common method of assessing 
competitiveness is to consider productivity-
adjusted wage growth in the whole economy, 
i.e. unit labour costs. A ﬁ  rst illustrative impression 
of the relationship between public wage growth 
and unit labour costs in the post-EMU period can 
be seen in Chart 12, which indicates that there 
was a reasonably strong association. In the decade 
under review, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal posted strong unit labour cost growth 
while wages in their public sectors grew rapidly. 
Table 2 underlines the signiﬁ  cant cross-country 
divergence, with these ﬁ   ve countries clearly 
seeing a greater increase in public as opposed to 
private wages.
Section 4 will examine the issue of 
competitiveness and the role of public-private 
wage interaction in more detail.
Table 2 Cumulative growth of public 
and private sector wages per employee 
(1999 – 2008)
Public sector  Private sector 
Euro area  34.9  24.2 
Belgium 36.6  31.7 
Germany 13.1  13.7 
Ireland 110.8  60.3 
Greece 108.7  62.0 
Spain 53.1  29.9 
France 31.3  32.9 
Italy 42.5  24.8 
Netherlands 38.5  40.0 
Austria 29.3  26.2 
Portugal 58.0  35.3 
Finland 41.7  38.8 
Source: OECD.15
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3.1  THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM THE RELATED 
LITERATURE
There are two main views on how public 
spending in general, and public wage expenditure 
in particular, should behave over the business 
cycle. The more extreme “demand management” 
perspective suggests that the ﬁ   scal stance be 
inversely related to the cyclical position of the 
economy. Accordingly, increased government 
expenditure should mitigate downturns by 
partly compensating for falling private demand 
and investment during such periods. In upturns, 
expenditure cuts could curb economic dynamics 
so as to prevent the economy from “overheating”. 
By contrast, the prescriptions from the tax 
smoothing literature suggest a more passive, 
stabilising role for public spending: ﬁ  scal policy 
responses to changes in cyclical conditions 
should mainly be conﬁ  ned to the free operation 
of automatic stabilisers.10 By implication, most 
spending items should not react to ﬂ  uctuations 
in economic activity, except for unemployment 
and other social beneﬁ  ts, which, owing to an 
increase (decrease) in the number of recipients 
during downturns (upturns), display an in-built 
counter-cyclical reaction.
Active demand management is subject to 
a number of problems. In particular, lags 
between the identiﬁ   cation of a downturn and 
the implementation of measures severely 
hamper their effectiveness and often result 
in de-stabilising policies.11 Moreover, while 
ﬁ  scal expansion might still be relatively easy to 
implement in the case of most spending items, 
the phasing-out of the respective programmes 
usually meets ﬁ   erce political opposition. 
This may lead to a gradual increase in the 
government sector after each expansionary 
episode rather than symmetric expenditure 
expansions and contractions over the cycle. 
In view of these risks, public wage spending 
does not emerge as a good candidate for 
counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy. 
First, to adjust this spending item, changes 
in public employment and/or re-negotiations 
of existing wage contracts are necessary, 
both of which are associated with lengthy 
administrative processes that imply substantial 
implementation lags. Second, and even more 
importantly, temporary expansions of the 
public wage bill would be difﬁ  cult to reverse 
given the high degree of coordination among 
public employees (e.g. through unionisation) 
which facilitates political opposition. Hence, 
policy-makers should not react to short-run 
ﬂ   uctuations in economic activity via public 
wage expenditure. Following a constant long-
term path in line with a prudent forecast of 
economic trends, the public wage bill, as a 
demand component that is unaffected by upturns 
and downturns, would then automatically help 
to stabilise the economy.
Given the size of public wage expenditure and 
employment, one would expect the cyclicality of 
government wage expenditure to be addressed 
extensively in the related empirical literature. 
Yet, while a lot of empirical research examines 
cyclical patterns of broad government spending 
variables (as well as certain sub-items, such as 
government investment), evidence on public 
wage expenditure is sparse. With respect to 
broad deﬁ   nitions of government expenditure, 
several studies support the notion of a pro-
cyclical spending bias. In an early contribution 
to this literature, Galí and Perotti (2003) ﬁ  nd a 
signiﬁ  cant positive reaction of cyclically adjusted 
primary spending in several EU countries to 
changes in the output gap for the period before 
the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty.12 
This result is further corroborated by recent 
literature. Turrini (2008), for example, documents 
For the classic argument underlying the former view, see Keynes  10 
(1936). The latter view is based on Barro (1979). While spending 
is treated as exogenous in Barro’s analysis, Talvi and Végh (2005), 
as well as Büttner and Wildasin (2009), show that under standard 
assumptions governments should also choose a smooth expenditure 
path over the cycle. For an overview of the main arguments, see 
ECB (2002) and European Commission (2004, 2006).
See, for example, Feldstein (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2003,  11 
2006), Lane (2003) and Cimadomo (2008). For an overview, 
see ECB (2004).
For recent reviews of the literature on the cyclicality of government  12 
spending, see Turrini (2008) and Beetsma et al. (2009).16
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a signiﬁ  cant pro-cyclical response in cyclically 
adjusted primary expenditure in euro area 
countries for the period 1980-2005. Similarly, 
for a panel of EU countries Holm-Hadulla et al. 
(2010) ﬁ  nd that governments respond to positive 
surprises in cyclical conditions by exceeding the 
spending targets laid out in their stability and 
convergence programmes. The few studies that 
do analyse public wage expenditure separately 
reach different conclusions. Lane (2003) ﬁ  nds 
strong pro-cyclicality in a sample of OECD 
countries over the period 1960-1998. By contrast, 
Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) detect weak 
counter-cyclical patterns of government wage 
expenditure for a sample of EU Member States 
over the period 1970-97.
This literature leaves a number of loose ends. 
First,  ﬁ   ndings on overall expenditure cannot 
be translated directly to individual government 
spending items since they are subject to different 
technical and political constraints. To capture 
systematic differences in the stabilising role 
of spending categories, a separate analysis of 
public wage expenditure is needed. While the 
above literature contributes to this aim, further 
analysis that also takes into account more 
recent developments in EU Member States is 
warranted. Second, the comparison of estimates 
across studies on ﬁ  scal cyclicality, in general, 
indicates that results are highly sensitive to 
differences in econometric methodology. These 
robustness concerns suggest that the conclusions 
from existing empirical evidence should be 
scrutinised carefully. Finally, in a monetary 
union, policy-makers need to be aware of public 
spending patterns and their demand effects, not 
only for single euro area countries but also for 
the euro area as a whole. Nevertheless, empirical 
evidence on the euro area as a separate economic 
region is scarce.
The next section reports results from a study 
that addresses these three issues. In particular, 
it analyses the cyclicality of the public wage bill 
and its subcomponents, applying a large number 
of different empirical methods to a panel for the 
euro area aggregate and individual countries 
over the period 1960-2005.
3.2  EVIDENCE FOR THE EURO AREA
In a recent study, Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht 
(2007) analyse the cyclical patterns of three 
variables that are of interest in the context of 
government wage expenditure: the public sector 
wage bill, compensation per public employee 
(both in real terms), and the number of public 
employees. The empirical analysis examines 
the co-movement of these variables with three 
indicators of economic activity: real GDP, real 
GDP per capita and unemployment. Consistent 
with the related empirical literature, the study 
uses statistical procedures that remove the long-
run trend from the variables to focus on their 
business cycle properties, deﬁ  ned as the recurrent 
ﬂ  uctuations of a time series around its long-run 
trend (see Lucas, 1977). Moreover, the study 
makes two further distinctions. First, it analyses 
co-movements between the above variables, 
removing solely the long-term trend. These are 
co-movements of all the ﬂ  uctuations  around 
trend, including both systematic responses of 
the  ﬁ   scal variables to economic conditions 
and irregular ﬂ  uctuations due to unpredictable 
shocks. Second, it considers the co-movement 
patterns of these variables, removing all the 
inertia of the series therefore isolating the pure 
“irregular component”. Co-movements, in this 
case, are between unpredictable ﬂ  uctuations 
due to shocks. For simplicity, we call the 
former “cyclical co-movements” and the latter 
“co-movements of shocks”.
More intuitively, systematic relationships 
between government wage expenditure 
and cyclical conditions might originate, for 
example, from indexation practices that tie 
government wages to inﬂ  ation, so that demand 
pressures in upswings are reﬂ  ected in higher 
growth in nominal wages per employee. 
Furthermore, if governments display a 
tendency to allow for a higher (lower) 
growth in the number of public employees 
in upturns (downturns), this would also give 
rise to systematic co-movement patterns. 
The co-movement of shocks might result, 
for example, from discretionary changes in 
the government’s ﬁ   scal policy stance when 17
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unexpected changes in cyclical conditions 
(“shocks”) occur. For instance, a “pro-cyclical” 
co-movement of shocks takes place when 
the hiring of additional civil servants or an 
unusually high wage increase coincides with 
higher than expected growth.
The results from Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht 
(2007) for the euro area aggregate are shown 
in Table 3. The ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve columns refer to the 
overall cyclical co-movements and the 
remaining columns to those attributed to 
shocks and discretionary policies. For each 
year, correlations of the public wage and 
employment variables with contemporaneous 
values of the economic indicators and with the 
values from the two preceding and subsequent 
periods are shown. The overall assessment of 
co-movement patterns for each pair of 
variables is based on the dominant correlation, 
i.e. the estimated correlation coefﬁ  cient with 
the highest absolute value (see bold ﬁ  gures).13 
A  ﬁ   scal variable is considered as lagging 
(leading) if the dominant correlation occurs 
between its current value and a value of the 
economic indicators from a preceding 
(subsequent) year.
A large number of statistical procedures (“ﬁ  lters”) are used  13 
in Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht (2007) to both extract the 
overall cyclical ﬂ   uctuations from time series data and to 
isolate the shock or discretionary ﬂ  uctuations.  Empirical 
ﬁ  ndings may differ substantially depending on which speciﬁ  c 
set-up is chosen. Thus, instead of choosing one preferred 
empirical set-up, the results reported here synthesise a large 
number of different methods into one estimate for the cyclical 
co-movements and the co-movements of shocks respectively. 
For a motivation and detailed description of all procedures 
applied in this context, see Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht 
(2007) pp. 11-18. By convention, co-movement patterns 
are considered acyclical if the dominant correlation ranges 
between 0 and 0.20 in absolute value; values between 0.20 
and 0.39 (-0.20 and -0.39) and between 0.40 and 0.49 (-0.40 
and -0.49) are considered weakly and moderately pro-cyclical 
(counter-cyclical) respectively. Strong pro-cyclicality (counter-
cyclicality) is reﬂ  ected in a value above 0.50 (below -0.50),
Table 3 Cyclicality of public wage and employment variables for the euro area aggregate
Cyclical co-movements Co-movements of shocks
Lags of wage/employment variable -2 -1 0 1 2 -2 -1 0 1 2
Entire sample period
Real compensation of public employees
Real GDP  0.31 0.21 0.52 0.74 0.60 -0.01 -0.20 0.09 0.35 0.16
Real GDP per capita  0.21 0.05 0.31 0.61 0.53 -0.02 -0.22 0.10 0.35 0.14
Unemployment rate 0.11 0.33 -0.07 -0.51 -0.27 0.10 0.26 -0.20 -0.42 0.12
Real compensation per public employee
Real GDP  0.34 0.12 0.36 0.59 0.39 0.05 -0.21 -0.01 0.36 0.08
Real GDP per capita  0.28 0.01 0.22 0.55 0.42 0.04 -0.25 0.01 0.37 0.07
Unemployment rate 0.01 0.40 -0.15 -0.63 -0.26 0.05 0.26 -0.19 -0.40 0.19
Public employment
Real GDP  -0.04 0.07 0.14 0.27 0.45 -0.13 -0.10 0.18 0.09 0.27
Real GDP per capita  -0.08 0.06 0.10 0.24 0.47 -0.12 -0.05 0.16 0.10 0.28
Unemployment rate 0.05 0.31 0.35 -0.22 -0.44 0.14 0.00 -0.12 -0.15 -0.14
Pre-Maastricht period
Real compensation of public employees
Real GDP  0.32 0.16 0.48 0.74 0.63 0.05 -0.29 0.11 0.42 0.07
Real GDP per capita  0.32 0.09 0.36 0.71 0.65 0.06 -0.28 0.11 0.44 0.06
Unemployment rate 0.16 0.51 -0.22 -0.70 -0.25 0.13 0.23 -0.33 -0.38 0.27
Real compensation per public employee
Real GDP  0.40 0.22 0.47 0.68 0.50 0.12 -0.27 -0.01 0.40 0.07
Real GDP per capita  0.39 0.13 0.36 0.67 0.54 0.10 -0.27 0.00 0.42 0.06
Unemployment rate 0.12 0.37 -0.28 -0.62 -0.22 0.06 0.25 -0.28 -0.40 0.26
Public employment
Real GDP  0.03 0.07 0.11 0.31 0.54 -0.10 -0.06 0.20 0.00 0.19
Real GDP per capita  0.09 0.06 0.02 0.25 0.56 -0.05 -0.03 0.17 0.01 0.17
Unemployment rate 0.12 0.33 0.19 -0.24 -0.28 0.10 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 -0.19
Sources: Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht (2007). 
Notes: Annual data. Sample period: 1960-2005 for upper panel; 1960-1992 for lower panel. Bold ﬁ  gures indicate dominant correlation, 
i.e. the estimated correlation coefﬁ  cient with the highest absolute value. A dominant correlation at a positive (negative) value for the lag in 
the respective wage or employment variable indicates that it is lagging (leading) the business cycle.18
ECB
Occasional Paper No 112
June 2010
For the euro area aggregate, government wage 
expenditure and compensation per employee 
follow a distinct pro-cyclical pattern in response 
to the three economic indicators. In particular, 
they are positively correlated with the business 
cycle at a one-year lag and the degree of 
pro-cyclicality is strong. The results for the 
irregular component are somewhat weaker 
but still sizeable. This suggests that countries’ 
discretionary policy measures may have actively 
contributed to the pro-cyclical co-movements 
between economic activity and the public wage 
variables found for the euro area aggregate. 
The response of public employment to changes 
in cyclical conditions is more sluggish. 
In particular, it follows real GDP and GDP 
per capita pro-cyclically with a two-year 
lag. However, the patterns are generally less 
pronounced than for the compensation variables, 
pointing only to moderate pro-cyclicality. 
Moreover, employment shocks still display a 
positive co-movement with GDP variables with 
a two-year lag, but the coefﬁ  cient only points 
to weak correlation. These results may reﬂ  ect 
that, owing to rigidities in labour markets and 
the associated transaction cost of employing or 
releasing workers, governments tend to respond 
more strongly via the wage rather than the 
employment component of the public wage bill. 
Stated differently, pro-cyclicality appears to 
derive mainly from wage-setting behaviour as 
opposed to employment decisions.
From a policy perspective it is also interesting 
to see whether spending and employment 
patterns have changed over time and, in 
particular, whether the EU ﬁ  scal  framework 
enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact has inﬂ  uenced 
policies in this regard. Unfortunately, the need 
for sufﬁ   ciently long time series inhibits an 
in-depth analysis of the post-Maastricht period. 
Instead, the analysis was repeated for the 
pre-Maastricht period and thereby indirectly 
examines whether there may be a difference 
between the two periods. While the 
co-movement patterns are relatively similar to 
those for the entire sample period, the results 
point to a slightly more pronounced 
pro-cyclicality for the pre-Maastricht period 
(see Table 3, lower panel). However, although 
differences in the general ﬁ   scal stance have 
also been found in related literature, 14 this 
observation does not provide conclusive 
evidence that the EU ﬁ   scal framework has 
reduced the pro-cyclicality of government 
wages and employment in the euro area.
The above patterns reﬂ  ect broadly similar ﬁ  ndings 
for individual euro area countries (see Table 4). 
The public wage bill, in real terms, shows 
moderate to strong pro-cyclicality in all countries 
with one or two lags (except for Italy, where the 
dominant correlation is contemporaneous, as 
well as Austria and Belgium, where economic 
activity lags the public wage bill). Wage bill and 
GDP growth shocks also tend to co-move in a 
positive manner, suggesting that policy-induced 
dynamics tend to reinforce ﬁ  scal pro-cyclicality. 
Yet, in several countries correlations are weak. 
Moreover, in Spain, Belgium, and Ireland the 
co-movements in the irregular component point 
to weak counter-cyclicality. Furthermore, the 
timing of the co-movements of shocks is less 
homogenous than for cyclical ﬂ  uctuations. While 
in some countries the public wage variables 
follow the economic indicators (e.g. in Germany 
and the Netherlands with a one-year lag, and in 
Italy and Finland with a two-year lag), in others 
they take the lead (e.g. two years in France and 
one in Spain).
Real compensation per employee follows 
patterns similar to those of the real public 
wage bill. In particular, co-movements with the 
economic indicators show the same direction 
for both overall cyclical ﬂ  uctuations and shocks. 
The only exceptions are the Netherlands, 
where discretionary policy has not added to 
pro-cyclicality, and Finland, where discretionary 
policies may have had a (weak) counter-cyclical 
contribution. In Ireland, results are inconclusive 
given that correlation coefﬁ  cients  differ 
For example, Galí and Perotti (2003) and Annett (2006) ﬁ  nd that  14 
ﬁ  scal policy in euro area countries was less pro-cyclical in the 
post-Maastricht period than in the pre-Maastricht period. 19
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strongly in size and direction between economic 
indicators.
For public employment the picture is very 
mixed. While for some series results are 
inconclusive or point to acyclicality, in several 
instances pro-cyclical behaviour with two lags 
is found. Again, this may reﬂ  ect the transaction 
cost associated with changes in the number 
of employees, which inhibits adjustments in 
the size of the public workforce to changes in 
economic conditions.
Table 4 Cyclicality of public wage and employment variables for selected euro area countries
Real compensation of public employees
Countries Type of co-movement pattern Direction Timing Degree of correlation
Belgium cyclical ﬂ  uctuations pro-cyclical two leads moderate
shocks and policy changes counter-cyclical two leads weak
Germany cyclical ﬂ  uctuations pro-cyclical one lag strong
shocks and policy changes pro-cyclical one lag strong
Ireland cyclical ﬂ  uctuations pro-cyclical two lags strong
shocks and policy changes counter-cyclical one lead moderate
Greece cyclical ﬂ  uctuations pro-cyclical one lag strong
shocks and policy changes pro-cyclical one lead weak
Spain cyclical ﬂ  uctuations pro-cyclical two lags moderate
shocks and policy changes counter-cyclical one lead weak
France cyclical ﬂ  uctuations pro-cyclical one lag moderate
shocks and policy changes pro-cyclical two leads weak
Italy cyclical ﬂ  uctuations pro-cyclical contemporaneous strong
shocks and policy changes pro-cyclical two lags weak
Netherlands cyclical ﬂ  uctuations pro-cyclical two lags strong
shocks and policy changes pro-cyclical one lag weak
Austria cyclical ﬂ  uctuations pro-cyclical one lead weak
shocks and policy changes pro-cyclical one lead weak
Portugal cyclical ﬂ  uctuations pro-cyclical one lag strong
shocks and policy changes pro-cyclical one lag weak
Finland cyclical ﬂ  uctuations pro-cyclical two lags strong
shocks and policy changes pro-cyclical two lags weak
Real compensation per public employee Public employment
Countries Direction Timing
Degree 
of correlation Direction Timing
Degree 
of correlation
Belgium pro-cyclical two leads moderate pro-cyclical two lags weak
counter-cyclical two leads weak pro-cyclical two lags weak
Germany pro-cyclical one lag moderate pro-cyclical two lags moderate
pro-cyclical one lag strong pro-cyclical two lags weak
Ireland inconclusive - - pro-cyclical two lags strong
inconclusive - - inconclusive - -
Greece pro-cyclical one lag weak pro-cyclical two leads strong
pro-cyclical one lead weak a-cyclical - -
Spain pro-cyclical one lead moderate inconclusive - -
counter-cyclical one lead weak pro-cyclical two lags weak
France pro-cyclical one lag moderate inconclusive - -
pro-cyclical two leads weak a-cyclical - -
Italy pro-cyclical contemporaneous moderate pro-cyclical contemporaneous moderate
pro-cyclical two lags weak a-cyclical - -
Netherlands pro-cyclical two lags moderate pro-cyclical two lags moderate
a-cyclical - - a-cyclical - -
Austria pro-cyclical one lead moderate pro-cyclical one lead weak
pro-cyclical one lead weak a-cyclical - -
Portugal pro-cyclical one lag moderate pro-cyclical contemporaneous borderline
pro-cyclical one lag weak a-cyclical - -
Finland pro-cyclical two lags strong pro-cyclical two lags moderate
counter-cyclical one lead weak inconclusive - -
Sources: Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht (2007). Sample period: 1960-2005.20
ECB
Occasional Paper No 112
June 2010
3.3  REMEDIES FOR PRO-CYCLICALITY
The  ﬁ   ndings described above suggest that 
government wage expenditure in the euro area 
and its member countries has mostly been 
pro-cyclical in recent decades. Besides 
reinforcing economic ﬂ   uctuations, such pro-
cyclical patterns may have an adverse effect on 
the quality of public ﬁ  nances. On the one hand, 
expansionary spending episodes during upturns 
bear the risk of remaining entrenched, thus 
inducing a secular growth of the public sector. 
On the other hand, cyclicality of government 
spending may also change the expenditure 
composition. During upturns it is often transfer 
and government wage expenditure that rise, 
while much of the burden of adjustment in 
consolidation periods tends to fall on public 
investment.15 Finally, pro-cyclical changes in 
public compensation per employee may put 
pressure on private wages in upswings, which 
would contribute to undermining competitiveness 
(for a detailed discussion see Section 4).
What should be done? As an immediate 
upshot, these ﬁ   ndings call for more ﬁ  scal 
prudence with respect to government wages 
and, in particular, a more acyclical stance in 
line with the automatic stabilisation objectives. 
However, in order for governments to change 
their policies successfully, behavioural 
incentives of politicians and wage negotiations 
may need to be improved through a suitable 
institutional environment. Here, two aspects 
deserve particular attention: rules-based ﬁ  scal 
frameworks and public sector wage-setting 
institutions.
Properly designed ﬁ  scal rules can provide a useful 
commitment device for policy-makers, allowing 
them to overcome common pool problems in 
ﬁ  scal  policy.16 For example, if governments 
are legally bound to respect certain spending 
limits, it will be easier for them to resist political 
pressures for budgetary expansion, since they 
are “tied to the mast”. While the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact 
provide a general ﬁ  scal framework for the EU, 
these legal and institutional provisions should 
be complemented by appropriate domestic ﬁ  scal 
rules. In fact, a widespread consensus on the 
beneﬁ  cial role of rules to restrict government 
expenditure has emerged, as summarised, 
for example, by the European Commission’s 
assessment that “Enforced national expenditure 
rules […] help to counteract forces leading to 
pro-cyclical ﬁ  scal policy in good times and thus 
prevent the need to retrench in bad times”.17
However, these effects on overall spending 
discipline do not provide a guarantee that pro-
cyclicality in government wage expenditure 
is also mitigated. For example, the strong 
bargaining position of public employees could 
be largely unaffected by rules restricting broad 
spending aggregates, since adjustment efforts 
could be redirected to other types of spending. 
Hence speciﬁ   c provisions, such as multi-year 
ceilings on the growth rate of the government 
wage bill, might be helpful to address the 
problem of pro-cyclicality in this spending 
item. In addition, such rules may support ﬁ  scal 
consolidation efforts by containing growth of this 
expenditure item and fostering competitiveness.
The effectiveness of ﬁ   scal frameworks in 
reducing pro-cyclicality is closely linked to 
public wage-setting institutions. In particular, 
in several euro area countries (e.g. Belgium, 
Cyprus and Luxembourg) public wages are 
explicitly indexed to inﬂ  ation.18 This indexation 
could complicate the task of adopting a sound 
ﬁ   scal stance. First, it establishes a direct 
positive link between cyclical conditions and 
See Alesina and Perotti (1995) and European Commission  15 
(2006). Interestingly, in those countries that achieved substantial 
and sustainable improvements in ﬁ  scal positions, consolidation 
also involved sizeable reductions in government wages and 
employment (see Hauptmeier, Heipertz and Schuknecht (2006)).
The deﬁ  nition of ﬁ  scal rules proposed by Kopits and Symansky  16 
(1998) is used. According to this deﬁ  nition,  ﬁ  scal  rules  are 
“a permanent constraint on ﬁ  scal policy, expressed in terms of 
a summary indicator of ﬁ  scal performance”. For a discussion of 
the political economy considerations in the design and workings 
of ﬁ  scal rules, see Schuknecht (2004) and Hallerberg, Strauch 
and von Hagen (2007). For empirical analyses documenting 
a favourable role of expenditure rules in reducing pro-cyclical 
spending bias, see Turrini (2008), Wierts (2008), Afonso and 
Hauptmeier (2009) and Holm-Hadulla (2010).
See European Commission (2004), p. 37. 17 
For more information on labour market institutions in European  18 
countries see Du Caju et al. (2008).21
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the public sector wage bill, since demand 
pressures in upswings will be reﬂ  ected  in 
higher growth in nominal wages per employee. 
In a similar vein, if public wages have a wage 
leadership role, it virtually guarantees cascading 
developments between private and public sector 
wages: indexation automatically ensures that in 
upturns, higher private wages and the associated 
inﬂ   ationary pressures will be reﬂ   ected in an 
increase in public wages, which in turn spills 
over to the private sector. Consequently, 
competitiveness losses and second-round 
effects on inﬂ   ation also become more likely 
(see Section 4).19 Finally, wage indexation 
may hamper the operation of ﬁ  scal rules to the 
extent they are formulated in nominal terms. 
In particular, it incorporates an “exogenous” 
component to developments in the overall 
compensation of employees which is beyond 
government control.
These arguments speak against the indexation 
of government wages.20 Moreover, the ﬁ  ndings 
suggest that public wage leadership in 
negotiations is particularly detrimental if public 
wages tend to be pro-cyclical. Multi-annual 
wage expenditure rules could help to reduce 
both ﬁ  scal pro-cyclicality and the interference 
of public wages with private sector 
competitiveness. Moreover, if the targets of 
such rules are sufﬁ  ciently ambitious they can 
also support ﬁ  scal consolidation by containing 
public wage expenditure growth.
This discussion illustrates the close interrelation 
between the cyclicality of public wages and their 
interaction with private sector wages, which will 
be examined in the next section.
For a similar argument, see ECB (2008a). For a theoretical  19 
overview on the impact of indexation on inﬂ  ation persistence, 
see Levin and Moessner (2005). Further information both on 
related theoretical literature and country studies is provided in 
ECB (2008c).
Of course, there are also compelling arguments against private  20 
sector wage indexation especially in EMU.22
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4  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WAGE INTERACTION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITIVENESS?
4.1  THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM THE 
RELATED LITERATURE
In the very long run, both private and public 
wages are driven by trends in prices and 
productivity. In the medium run and, in 
particular, the short run, deviations from the 
long-run trend are possible. In this context, 
the interrelation between public and private 
wages in the euro area is considered in this 
section, taking into account its implications 
for economic growth and stabilisation. 
If public wages rise disproportionately and 
spill over to the private sector in certain 
countries, imbalances may arise since the 
unit labour costs of these countries could 
increasingly diverge from those of other 
countries. There may be adverse effects on 
their competitiveness, export performance 
and economic growth, which may be 
unsustainable in the medium to long run. 
Disequilibria may be hidden in an overall 
favourable environment during upturns, but 
they may precipitate and reinforce downturns, 
notably if downward wage rigidities in these 
countries prevent wages from adjusting. Given 
the absence of country-speciﬁ  c  monetary 
and exchange rate policies, the cost in terms 
of employment could be even larger than if 
countries were able to partly accommodate 
such trends via these policy instruments. 
Loss of export market share, delocalisation 
of labour and higher regional unemployment 
could be the result. Such persistent losses of 
competitiveness, leading to an accumulation 
of imbalances, should not be confused with 
adjustment to country-speciﬁ  c shocks, which 
in EMU requires temporary differences in 
inﬂ  ation and growth.21
Until recently, the literature has paid limited 
attention to the correlation between public and 
private wages, and the consequences of 
government wage decisions for private sector 
wages, labour markets and economic 
performance.22
The main theoretical reference regarding the 
direction of expected causality is the so-called
Scandinavian model of inﬂ  ation. This model, 
developed by Aukrust (1977) for the case 
of a small open economy, assumes that 
a) different sectors of the economy are either 
exposed to or sheltered from international 
competition (the sector that is most affected 
by international competition is commonly 
thought of as the manufacturing sector or other 
parts of the private sector, whereas the public 
sector is assumed to be largely protected from 
competition), b) wage decisions in different 
sectors are staggered (i.e. wages in different 
sectors are set at different points in time), and 
c) exchange rates are ﬁ  xed. The model stipulates 
that the traded-goods sector is the wage leader 
in that wages in the traded-goods sector are 
determined by productivity and prices. Wage 
increases in the traded-goods sector are then 
See, for instance, ECB (2008b). 21 
As explained by Demekas and Kontolemis (2000), among others,  22 
this implicitly reﬂ  ects the assumption that these decisions do not 
merit separate consideration, either because a) public wages are 
typically assumed to be exogenous or to be determined in the same 
way as private wages (i.e. they are the outcome of a bargaining 
process between the government and public employees’ unions) 
(Quadrini and Trigari (2007), Ardagna (2007), Holmlund (1993) 
and Calmfors and Horn (1986)), or b) they do not inﬂ  uence the 
labour market and the economy as a whole. Perhaps the most 
relevant reference is Lane and Perotti (2003), who, in a panel 
study,  ﬁ   nd that public wage consumption can inﬂ  uence  a 
country’s international competitiveness by altering unit labour 
costs and proﬁ  tability. The remaining existing empirical work 
tends to focus on quantity links (employment) rather than 
price links (wages) between the public and private sectors. For 
example, Alesina et al. (2002) ﬁ  nd a sizeable negative effect of 
public spending, and particularly its wage component (the total 
wage bill), on private sector proﬁ  ts and on business investment. 
Ardagna (2007) claims that the latter results are consistent 
with the different theoretical models in which government 
employment creates wage pressure for the private sector, and 
thus can be used as anecdotal evidence supporting the notion that 
the direction of causality would go from public sector wages and 
employment to private sector wages and employment. This study 
claims that this supports the theoretical assumption of exogenous 
public wages and employment. See also, for instance, Algan, 
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2002), Forni and Giordano (2003) and 
Gregory and Borland (1999), and the literature quoted therein.23
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transmitted to the sheltered sector (the public 
sector, where productivity growth is lower), 
which is possible since wage decisions are 
staggered.23 This happens through central, 
intermediate and local wage formation.24
Alternatively, however, it is possible that the 
direction of spillovers could be opposite to that 
hypothesised by the Scandinavian model. Wage 
setting in sheltered sectors operates in a less 
competitive environment and so may result in 
higher outcomes, all other things being equal. 
In an integrated labour market, higher wages 
in the sheltered sectors may be transmitted to 
higher wages in the exposed sectors, eventually 
above the level of productivity. As the public 
sector is one of the most sheltered sectors, 
public wages may assume a leadership role, at 
least in the short to medium run (as per some of 
the ﬁ  ndings in the Box).
Additional channels for the sources of wage 
linkages from the public to the private sector 
are identiﬁ   ed by Afonso and Gomes (2008), 
who use a macroeconomic model to analyse the 
effects of public sector employment and wages. 
In this model, public sector wages inﬂ  uence 
private sector wages in three ways. First, public 
sector wages affect the outside option of the 
unemployed by increasing the value of being 
employed in the public sector. Therefore, they 
put pressure on wage bargaining. Second, 
public wages have to be ﬁ  nanced by an increase 
in taxes, which will reduce the overall gain 
from a worker accepting a private sector job 
and increase the wage paid by the ﬁ  rm. Third, 
higher public sector wages crowd out private 
sector employment which, because the marginal 
worker is less productive, raises average 
productivity and therefore the average private 
sector wage. The authors also suggest that 
public sector wage growth may carry a signal 
to the private sector about the government’s 
inﬂ  ation expectations.
Fernández-de-Cordoba, Pérez and Torres (2009) 
develop a dynamic general equilibrium model 
in which the public and private sectors interact 
in the labour market and wages in both sectors 
are determined endogenously. Thus, they 
depart from the standard approach of assuming 
exogenous rules for public wages and public 
employment. Within that framework, they ﬁ  nd 
that the response of wages to a technology 
shock (which can be thought of as an increase in 
productivity in the economy) is consistent with 
an observed positive correlation between public 
and private sector wages. More interestingly, 
even a private sector-speciﬁ  c productivity shock 
spills over to the public sector, increasing public 
wages. The model is also, however, consistent 
with the notion of the private sector having a 
wage-leading role if technology shocks are, 
on average, the main drivers of business cycle 
ﬂ  uctuations. Nevertheless, public wages would 
lead private wages in certain episodes.
It is also worth brieﬂ  y reviewing the institutional 
settings in the euro area, which overall point to a 
lead role for the private sector and some indicators 
of bi-directional causality. In many euro area 
countries, a norm of comparison or reference 
point plays an important role in public sector 
wage setting, although rarely through formalised 
arrangements.25 Ireland is the only country where 
the pay of public servants is benchmarked with 
private sector comparators. In several other 
countries, private sector pay increases are taken 
as reference points, at least unofﬁ  cially. 
In Germany, private sector bargaining outcomes 
usually set a pattern for pay increases in the 
public sector. In Austria, where no ofﬁ  cial 
benchmarking exists either, the metalworking 
industry agreement is an important reference 
point. In Finland, government agencies make pay 
Strom (1997) assumes that government wages are determined as  23 
a mark-up on private sector pay, where changes in the mark-up
might be associated with changes in the bargaining power of 
government sector workers.
Central negotiations refer to wage negotiations between the  24 
central organisations of a national labour market, whereas 
intermediate negotiations refer to wage negotiations between 
employer and employee organisations. Local wage formation 
refers to wage setting at individual workplaces. Further 
supporting the idea of private wage leadership, Forni and 
Giordano (2003) explain another key way in which private 
sector developments can inﬂ  uence public wages; resources to 
pay public employees are largely drawn, through taxation, from 
private sector labour earnings.
See Wage Dynamics Network ﬁ  ndings (for instance Du Caju et  25 
al (2008)).24
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comparisons between the private and public 
sectors to help draft the pay policy of central 
government. In the Netherlands, public sector 
pay increases are based on an index calculated by 
the Ministry of the Interior, which takes into 
account pay developments in the private sector. 
Some forms of benchmarking with the private 
sector are also present in Belgium and Portugal. 
These benchmarking institutions, ofﬁ  cial or not, 
would suggest that the public sector has more of 
a follower role when it comes to wage setting.
From a normative viewpoint, public wage 
leadership need not necessarily have adverse 
effects. In a recession, it could exert a 
moderating inﬂ   uence by acting as a good 
example in the presence of downward wage 
rigidities in the private sector. Similarly, in a 
boom, as it is a more sheltered sector, the public 
sector could potentially moderate private sector 
wage growth if it has a lead role. However, it is 
not clear that such positive outcomes would be 
easy to achieve.
As regards empirical evidence, the existing 
ﬁ  ndings for various countries generally conﬁ  rm 
a lead role for the private sector. However, there 
are a number of cases of bi-directional causality 
(i.e. running from public to private wages and 
vice versa), but limited evidence that the public 
sector exerts a fully ﬂ   edged leadership role 
(see the Box). Note that none of these refer to 
the euro area or indeed individual euro area 
countries in the period since the start of EMU.
Box 
PREVIOUS STUDIES FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES1
For Sweden, three studies (Jacobson and Ohlsson (1994), Andersson and Isaksson (1997) and 
Lindquist and Vilhelmsson (2004)) ﬁ  nd evidence in favour of the Scandinavian model, i.e. that 
private sector wages lead public wages. The results of three further studies differ, demonstrating 
no evidence of a clear wage-leading role for the private sector. Of these studies, Holmlund and 
Ohlsson (1992) report bi-directional causality. Tagtstrom (2000) ﬁ  nds that the manufacturing 
sector is a wage leader for government wages and that government wages lead the rest of the 
private sector. Friberg (2007), who considers several sub-sectors of the economy, ﬁ  nds that 
central government wages lead wages in a) the manufacturing sector, b) the private sector as a 
whole and c) the ﬁ  nancial sector. He also observes the reverse causality for a) and b).
Overall, evidence of public wage leadership is limited, with only Tagtstrom and Friberg showing, 
respectively, that government wages lead non-manufacturing wages and ﬁ  nancial sector wages. 
However, it is important to note that the structure of the Swedish labour market differs from 
other European countries. For example, unionisation is higher in Sweden than in all other OECD 
countries, while the wage bargaining system is lengthier and covers a greater number of workers.
Demekas and Kontolemis (1999) ﬁ  nd that, for Greece, real government wages are weakly 
exogenous for private sector wages, i.e. higher government wages lead, through worker ﬂ  ow 
dynamics, to higher private sector wages (and to higher unemployment).
Mizala and Romaguera (1995) ﬁ  nd bi-directional causality between the private and public sectors 
in Chile prior to labour market liberalisation in the early 1980s. After this, once the labour market 
is no longer under state control, private wages lead public wages.
1   See Chart 14 in the appendix for more detailed results and deﬁ  nitions of certain terms.25
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4.2  EVIDENCE FOR THE EURO AREA
4.2.1 EVIDENCE USING ANNUAL DATA
A number of recent studies aim to shed light 
on the interaction between public and private 
sector wages in the euro area. Lamo, Pérez 
and Schuknecht (2008) conduct time series 
analyses of the co-movement and causality of 
public and private sector wages for 11 euro 
area countries and the euro area aggregate 
over the period 1960-2007 using annual data. 
Moreover, the study looks at the relationship 
between these correlation and co-movement 
patterns and institutional features of 
countries’ labour and product markets, 
notably countries’ wage-setting institutions. 
When examining the co-movement between 
public and private wages, emphasis is placed 
on generating robust findings by applying a 
large number of statistical techniques to 
various definitions of wages and synthesising 
the results.26
The empirical ﬁ  ndings for the euro area and 
its member countries show a strong, positive 
correlation over the business cycle for both 
real and nominal wages. The correlation 
is mostly of a contemporaneous nature. 
Correlation coefﬁ   cients are signiﬁ  cant  and 
typically very high (in most cases above 0.8; 
see Table 5), indicating a common pattern 
of private and public wage correlation 
across countries. These ﬁ  ndings  are 
consistent with both the stylised facts and 
the theoretical arguments presented above 
and point to strong cross-sectoral linkages 
in wage setting, as public and private wage 
developments do not diverge signiﬁ  cantly 
(in other words they do not decouple) even in 
the short run.
Wages in both sectors also share a common 
long-run trend. Statistically, this is shown by 
two approaches.27 First, correlation coefﬁ  cients 
between forecast errors of public and private 
wages tend to become larger over time. This 
is indicative of an even stronger co-movement 
of public and private wages in the medium to 
long term (Germany is an exception, with a 
slightly declining correlation coefﬁ  cient)  as 
illustrated in Chart 13.
For a motivation and detailed description of all procedures  26 
applied in this context, see Lamo et al. (2008) p. 12.
The existence of a long-run relationship between public and  27 
private sector wages is shown via well-established cointegration 
techniques and with wthe help of correlation coefﬁ  cients  of 
forecast errors from vector autoregressive (VAR) systems at 
different forecast horizons, following Den Haan (2000).
In the case of Romania, the Christou, Klemm and Tifﬁ  n (2007) report that private sector wages 
lead government wages over the period 1993-2006. Since 1998, however, the authors ﬁ  nd 
bi-directional causality: since Romania has become a market economy and labour market conditions 
have become tighter, government wage policy seems to inﬂ  uence private sector wage settlements. 
Wages in the state-owned enterprise sector also affect private sector wage developments.
For Canada, Bemmels and Zaidi (1990) look at many sub-industries (both in manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing) and ﬁ  nd conﬁ  rmation of the Scandinavian model. They ﬁ  rst identify wage-
leading sectors to be a) the mining and primary metals industries and b) the petroleum and coal 
industries (i.e. the tradable sectors). They then show that wage increases in these leading sectors 
cause wage increases in the non-leading industries, but not vice versa.
Table 5 Contemporaneous correlations 
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The study then examines whether developments 
in private sector wages in one year have a causal 
inﬂ   uence on public sector pay the year after
and/or whether “causation” goes from public 
sector wage developments to private wages.28 
There are three main ﬁ  ndings. The ﬁ  rst refers to 
the direct interaction between private and public 
sector nominal wages on the basis of a 
bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis 
(see Table 6, column 1) where rather 
heterogeneous results are found. The private 
sector seems to lead public sector wage 
developments across years in Germany, Spain, 
France, Austria and Belgium and at the euro 
area aggregate. An important role of the public 
sector can be found in Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Finland, which show bi-directional 
causality, and in the Netherlands, where only 
the public sector appears to lead. In Ireland there 
is no signiﬁ   cant econometric evidence of 
causality with this approach.
However, this analysis leaves out the potentially 
very important indirect interaction between public 
and private wages via the price level. Prices 
are, therefore, taken explicitly into account in a 
trivariate VAR analysis. Moreover, this analysis 
examines (as a “by-product”) whether second-
round effects tend to emerge from the interaction 
between public and private wages and prices. 
In this set-up, a signiﬁ   cant public sector role 
is found in a number of countries for the direct 
relationship between private and public wages 
(column 2). In particular, there is a bi-directional 
relationship between public and private wages for 
Ireland, France, Italy, Netherlands and Finland. 
Private wages lead in Germany, Greece, Portugal 
and the euro area aggregate. For the other euro 
area countries no causality is found.
The VAR analysis also shows signiﬁ  cant indirect 
spillover effects from private wages to the price 
level for all countries and the euro area aggregate 
(column 3). This inﬂ   uence can also be found 
for public wages in most countries, although the 
evidence is, in many cases, weaker and depends on 
the price level indicator. Price level changes are, 
in turn, found to affect private and public wages 
(column 4). This causality analysis can also be 
interpreted as showing that the wage-price spiral 
(including via the public sector) is a signiﬁ  cant 
source not only of wage spillovers but also of 
second round effects on inﬂ  ation in most member 
countries and for the euro area aggregate.
The question of whether the heterogeneity of 
the public-private causality results is related 
to differences in labour and product market 
institutions – and notably wage-setting
institutions – between countries is also 
addressed in Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht 
(2008). They examine the role of institutional 
features in raising the probability of Granger 
causality from public to private wages. 
In those instances where public sector 
wage leadership was statistically signiﬁ  cant 
The underlying criterion applied here is that of Granger causality. 28   
The study runs Granger causality tests looking, ﬁ  rst, at VARs 
between detrended variables (using eleven detrending methods), 
and thus focusing on the Granger causal links over the business 
cycle. Second, VARs in levels (logs) of the variables aim to 
look beyond the business cycle. In a recent paper Lamo, Pérez 
and Schuknecht (2010) explore, for several OECD countries, 
a concept of public wage leadership based on vector error 
correction models (VECM), similar to the one used in Lindquist 
and Vilhelmsson (2004).
Chart 13 Correlation of forecast errors from 





















Sources: Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht (2008). 
Notes: h-step ahead forecast errors, h=1, 2, …, 9. VAR 
speciﬁ  cation with unit root imposed. Sample period: 1960-2007.27
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(i.e. public sector wages caused private sector 
wages), the dependent variable takes the value 
of 1 (183 observations), otherwise it is set as 
zero (249 observations). Explanatory variables 
include a set of standard OECD-based variables 
of labour and product market institutions, a set 
of variables on wage-bargaining institutions in 
the euro area generated from the information 
collected within the European System of Central 
Banks Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), plus a 
measure of globalisation and size of government 
(public employment ratio).
The ﬁ  ndings conﬁ  rm the importance of certain 
labour and product market institutions in making 
public wage leadership more likely (see Table 
9 in the appendix), although the robustness of 
results is not uniform and the analysis encounters 
problems of multicollinearity. First, stronger 
bargaining coordination between negotiating 
parties, which includes state-sponsored and 
state-imposed coordination, government 
involvement in collective bargaining and higher 
union membership, suggest a strong role for a 
wage negotiation benchmark, and this may 
most easily be in the public sector owing to 
the higher degree of unionisation. Second, 
stronger  product market regulation facilitates 
public sector leadership. Stronger exposure to 
competition, by contrast, would result in market 
forces being more dominant in wage setting. 
Third, a larger share of public employment, 
proxying the size and “weight” of the public 
sector is correlated with a higher probability of 
public wage leadership.
The following factors were conﬁ  rmed 
to reduce the likelihood of public sector 
wages causing private wages. First, stricter 
employment protection legislation gives unions 
greater bargaining power in the private sector, 
independent of public sector outcomes and 
therefore coincides with a weaker inﬂ  uence 
of public wages. Second, a higher degree of 
(private sector) price indexation is less likely to 
be positively correlated with public than with 
private sector wage leadership, since private 
wages – by comprising about 80% of countries’ 
wage bills – are a key driver of inﬂ  ation. 
This, in turn, determines the next round of 
wage increases (wage-price spiral). Third, a 
prevalence of occupational and company-level 
wage setting is likely to focus negotiations 
on the speciﬁ   c (private) occupation or ﬁ  rm 
situation and therefore less likely to coincide 
with a strong lead role for the public sector.
Table 6 Direction of causality (VARs in levels)
Nominal wage causality 
without inﬂ  ation 
Bivariate analysis
Nominal wage leadership/causality and interaction with inﬂ  ation 
Trivariate analysis
(Public-private wages) Causality between 
public-private wages
Causality from private/
public wages to prices
Causality from prices 
to private/public wages
(1) Leading sector (2) Leading sector (3) Sector affecting prices (4) Sector affected by prices
Euro area Private Private Both, weaker public  Both
Belgium Private Both, weaker public
Germany Private Private, weak Private Both
Ireland Bi-directional, weak Both, weak Both
Greece Bi-directional Private Private Both, weaker public
Spain Private Both Both
France Private Bi-directional Both, weaker public Both
Italy Bi-directional Bi-directional, weak Both, weaker public Both
Netherlands Public Bi-directional  Both, weaker public  Both
Austria Private  Both, weaker public
Portugal Bi-directiona Private Both, weak Both, weaker public
Finland Bi-directional Bi-directional, weak Both  Both, weaker public
Source: Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht (2008).
Notes: In columns 2-4, weak causality implies signiﬁ  cance of only one of the two price indicators. “Bi-directional” refers to causality 
going from public to private wages and vice versa. “Both” in columns 3 and 4 refers to causality going from both private and public sector 
to prices and vice versa. The price level is measured by the GDP deﬂ  ator. Sample period 1990-2006.28
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4.2.2 EVIDENCE USING INTRA-ANNUAL DATA
Pérez and Sánchez (2010) focus especially on 
the short-term interaction between public and 
private wages. They analyse causality between 
public and private sector wages for Germany, 
Spain, France and Italy. First, they construct 
a dataset of quarterly government wages and 
employment by applying mixed-frequency 
time series models to monthly, quarterly and 
annual information from 1981 onwards. With 
this dataset, the study conducts a VAR analysis 
that incorporates public wages, private wages 
and the price level. The VARs also include, as 
control variables, productivity and a number of 
institutional variables.
This approach addresses three shortcomings 
in the previous study. First, contemporaneous 
intra-annual causality between public and 
private wages can be analysed. Second, the 
dataset contains sufﬁ   cient observations so as 
to permit separate examinations for the pre 
and post-Maastricht periods. Third, the larger 
number of observations allows the inclusion of 
more control variables, such as productivity.
The main results are as follows. When intra-annual
information is included, the leading role of 
the public sector is reinforced. The main 
conclusion of the analysis is the existence of 
robust cross-country empirical evidence of 
mostly directs signals (intra-annual links) 
between wages in the public and the private 
sectors. The results are broadly similar 
across the two samples selected. They are 
reinforced in a restricted VAR estimation, 
i.e. some quarterly information is left out 
in order to isolate “purely within-the-year” 
interactions between wages in both sectors. 
The results show strong linkages between 
wages in both sectors, with a predominance of 
bi-directional links in the cases of Germany and 
Spain. In addition, leadership of public wages 
in France in the 1991-2007 sample, and in the 
case of Italy for within-the-year estimations, 
are quite robust features of the data. This 
suggests that public sector wage setting has a 
particularly important role in the short run, i.e. 
within annual wage negotiation rounds.
Meanwhile, productivity does not play a central 
role as a channel for private/public wage 
causation at the short-term/quarterly frequency. 
Moreover, they ﬁ   nd robust evidence of the 
existence of a complex structure of indirect 
links via institutional control variables.
One way of illustrating and synthesising the 
strong result of bi-directionality is to look at 
the results of the VAR model analysis in terms 
of public and private leadership across four 
countries, but extended to account for two price 
level variables and six model speciﬁ  cations. 
For each episode (1981-2007 and 1991-2007), 
there are therefore 48 observations. For the 
longer period, 85% of the models/observations 
suggest private wages causing public wages 
and 75% suggest public wages inﬂ  uencing 
private wages at the 90% conﬁ  dence  level
(see Table 7). For the most recent episode, about 
60% of the observations suggest private wage 
causation while 75% conﬁ   rm public wages 
causing private ones.
4.2.3 EVIDENCE USING PANEL DATA
The previous results on the importance of public 
sector wage developments to the private sector 
are broadly conﬁ  rmed by another study for the 
“average” of their sample countries (it does not 
examine public-private wage interaction at the 
individual country level). Afonso and Gomes 
(2008) conduct a pooled analysis of public 
and private sector wage growth, including the 
estimation of a relationship between private 
sector wage growth and its determinants. They 
use the same OECD wage dataset for OECD and 
European Union countries for the period between 
Table 7 Percentage of models/observations 
suggesting public/private wage leadership
1981-2007 1991-2007 
(post-Maastricht)
Public wage causation 
to private wages 0.75 0.8
Private wage causation 
to public wages 0.85 0.6
Source: Pérez and Sánchez (2010).
Notes: Models/observations can suggest both private and public 
wage causation, i.e. bi-directionality.29
ECB
Occasional Paper No 112
June 2010




1970 and 1998/2006 as the other two studies. 
Nominal and deﬂ  ated compensation per public 
sector employee display a statistically signiﬁ  cant 
positive contemporaneous correlation with 
private sector wages. In terms of causality, they 
estimate that a 1% increase in public sector wages 
increases contemporaneous private sector wage 
growth by around 0.3%. Divergences between 
public and private wages, or other shocks to the 
public/private wage ratio, tend to correct over 
time, albeit at a very slow pace. While this study 
provides a less direct measure of causality in 
the euro area than the previous two studies, it 
complements them by underlining the role of the 
public sector in inﬂ  uencing private sector wages.
4.3  REMEDIES FOR SPILLOVERS INTO 
COMPETITIVENESS
The above ﬁ   ndings indicate that public and 
private wages do not decouple. For the most 
part, private sector wages seem to exert a 
stronger inﬂ   uence on public wages than vice 
versa. However, for the euro area aggregate, and 
in many individual countries, results of 
correlation and causality analysis also suggest 
an important inﬂ  uence from the public sector on 
private sector wages, both directly and indirectly 
via prices. In some countries, the issue of public 
wage spillovers is particularly important. For 
example, in Section 2, it was identiﬁ  ed that since 
the start of EMU, certain countries (Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal) have 
experienced high and volatile public wage 
growth and rapid increases in unit labour costs. 
Section 4 shows that, in all of these countries, 
there is at least some causality from public to 
private wages. There are direct and indirect bi-
directional links in Ireland and Italy, and 
linkages to a lesser extent in Greece, Spain and 
Portugal.29 In addition, France the Netherlands 
and Finland exhibit bi-directional causality.
Several mechanisms have been identiﬁ  ed 
which make public sector wage leadership 
more likely, including (from Section 4.1): 
wage setting operating in a less competitive 
environment and resulting in higher outcomes 
before being transmitted to more exposed 
sectors; higher public wage growth raising the 
bargaining power of private sector employees; 
and higher public wage growth reducing 
private sector employment and therefore 
raising average private sector productivity/
wages. The response of wages to a technology 
shock is also relevant, given that expectations 
of permanently higher productivity growth 
may have contributed to the boom periods in 
some countries, as well as the subsequent bust. 
Furthermore, in Section 4.2, several features of 
domestic labour and product market institutions 
were conﬁ  rmed as inﬂ  uencing the likelihood of 
public sector wage leadership.
These  ﬁ   ndings have important policy 
implications. First, public wage restraint could 
be a crucial factor in maintaining a country’s 
competitiveness. As second-round effects 
from prices to wages seem to be a key driver 
of wage and price dynamics in virtually all 
countries (with strong effects on public wages 
in most countries), it reinforces the potential 
role for public wage restraint to help maintain 
price stability. The importance of public 
wage restraint is particularly salient where the 
public sector exerts a signalling role. Second, 
the reform of institutions that induce public 
wage leadership may be warranted if they are 
prone to causing imbalances via public wage 
causality.30 For example, less coordinated and 
more decentralised wage bargaining, measures 
to increase competition in product markets 
(instilling greater discipline in the private sector) 
and a smaller public sector workforce would 
be beneﬁ   cial in this context. To that effect, 
some of the remedies identiﬁ  ed in Section 3.3 
(such as decoupling public sector wages from 
private sector benchmarks and the abolition of 
Of those countries identiﬁ  ed in Section 2 as experiencing large  29 
increases in public wages and unit labour costs over the last 
decade, both Ireland and Spain have seen much larger rises in 
unemployment in the current recession than might have been 
expected by considering the fall in GDP (see ECB (2009), p. 53).
This reﬂ   ects, to a signiﬁ   cant extent, the imbalanced growth 
experienced in the preceding years, of which strong public wage 
growth is one phenomenon.
Of course, even if direct spillovers are reduced, the public sector  30 
still has an important role to play by setting an example to the 
private sector and building a constituency for restrained wage 
growth and low inﬂ  ation.30
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indexation) would not only reduce pro-cyclicality 
but would have the additional beneﬁ  t of reducing 
spillovers into competitiveness.
Third, wage expenditure rules or ceilings on 
public wage growth could be an appropriate 
policy strategy. As discussed in Section 3.3, such 
rules are useful in limiting pro-cyclical tendencies 
in public wage expenditure, thereby improving 
the overall cyclical stance of ﬁ   scal policy. In 
addition, permanent rules for public sector wage 
setting can serve to align long-term government 
wage dynamics with general economic trends. 
Policy-makers face a trade-off when deﬁ  ning the 
targets or ceilings of government wage dynamics 
for such a rule: if compensation in the public 
sector is above the private sector (accounting for 
differences in skill composition, working 
conditions, job security and other relevant 
factors), competitiveness losses may be induced 
via the channels discussed above. If the opposite 
holds true, this may lead to a risk of impairing the 
recruitment and retention of skilled public sector 
workers. Assuming that, at the time of adopting a 
wage rule, such problems do not exist, the rule for 
nominal public wage growth should be based on 
a prudent forecast of productivity growth in the 
private sector, as well as the expected inﬂ  ation 
rate that is in line with price stability. By contrast, 
if, at the outset of adopting such a rule, prevailing 
levels of public wages are already subject to a 
misalignment, a (temporary) deviation from this 
path may be warranted.31 In particular, in countries 
in which past public wage setting has already 
contributed to private sector competitiveness 
losses, a period of real public sector wage growth 
below productivity trends would be necessary.
Fiscal policies should not stoke imbalances and 
losses of competitiveness, but rather facilitate 
competitive adjustment where needed. The 
strong public wage growth in a number of 
euro area countries, particularly in those where 
competitiveness problems and macroeconomic 
and  ﬁ   scal imbalances have been greatest in 
recent years, needs to be followed by signiﬁ  cant 
adjustment. This, in turn, should facilitate 
the correction of private sector wages and 
improvements in competitiveness.
Structural unemployment levels may be another factor to  31 
consider in the deﬁ  nition of public wage rules. In particular, 
higher structural unemployment may warrant more prudence in 
constraining public wage developments.31
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5  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper addresses the role of government 
wages as a determinant of macroeconomic 
stability and competitiveness in the euro area. 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that real 
government wage expenditure is subject to a 
pro-cyclical bias, i.e. it co-moves positively with 
the business cycle in most euro area countries 
and at the euro area aggregate level. Thus, 
it may reinforce rather than mitigate ﬂ  uctuations 
in economic activity. Moreover, the evidence 
points to a strong, positive correlation and 
co-movement between public and private wages 
in the short to medium term, both directly and 
indirectly via the price level. In a number of 
countries this interrelation has coincided with 
strong public wage growth and intra-euro area 
competitiveness losses.
These ﬁ  ndings suggest that governments should 
be cautious that wage-setting and employment 
policies do not lead to negative repercussions 
on  ﬁ   scal and economic performance. First, 
there appears to be a need to strengthen 
ﬁ   scal discipline and to reduce the risk of 
pro-cyclicality in government wage expenditure. 
To this end, strict domestic ﬁ   scal rules and 
medium-term budgetary frameworks could be 
effective tools to constrain the volatility and 
pro-cyclicality of this spending item. In addition, 
reforms in labour market institutions may be 
needed to avoid institutional biases towards 
pro-cyclicality, e.g. originating from indexation 
that ties government wages to inﬂ  ation.
Second, given the interrelation between 
government and private sector wage 
developments, policy-makers would be 
well-advised to adopt a prudent approach to 
government sector wage setting to mitigate the 
risk of competitiveness losses in the private 
sector. While the speciﬁ  c reform needs differ 
across countries, a strengthening of ﬁ  scal 
institutions is likely to facilitate such prudence. 
Reforms in labour market institutions, 
for instance towards less coordinated wage 
bargaining and more decentralised wage 
setting, as well as product market liberalisation, 
may further reduce the risk of adverse 
government wage spillovers and facilitate wage 
adjustment in the private sector.
The implementation of such reforms may 
well be associated with political opposition. 
However, the “double dividend” of greater 
economic stability and a lower risk of intra-euro 
area competitiveness losses should encourage 
policy-makers to undertake the necessary 
adjustments.32
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ANNEX
DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
For the stylised facts in Section 2, the cyclicality 
study in Section 3 and the co-movement study 
using annual data in Section 4, the OECD 
Economic Outlook database Autumn 2009 issue 
is used. Missing variables for some speciﬁ  c 
time periods/variables in this issue of the OECD 
have been completed with information from the 
Spring 2006, the Spring 2007 and the Spring 
2008 issues.
The euro area aggregate includes eleven 
countries, while it excludes Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia owing to lack of 
data for these countries. German series have 
been built up on the basis of (i) from 1991 
onwards, uniﬁ  ed Germany; (ii) for the period 
1960-90, back-casted uniﬁ   ed Germany levels 
using the growth rates of the corresponding 
West German variables. Similarly, missing data 
for public sector compensation of employees 
in Belgium in the 1970s necessitates the use of 
back-casting using the European Commission 
Ameco database to ﬁ  ll the gaps.
The terms “government” and “public” sector 
are used interchangeably. In both cases, the 
text refers to the deﬁ  nition of the “government 
sector” adopted by the OECD (see http://stats.
oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1139) and not 
the broader concept of the “public sector” (see 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2199). 
In the context of public wages and employment, 
this distinction is relevant since the latter 
concept also includes public corporations, which 
in some cases might give rise to ambiguities on 
how to differentiate between public and private 
wages and employment. Only in the case of 
Ireland the data includes also the employees 
of public enterprises. For additional statistical 
issues regarding the deﬁ   nition of government 
employment see OECD (1997).
Compensation per employee is computed using 
compensation of employees and employment 
data. Private sector compensation of employees 
is deﬁ  ned as total compensation of employees 
minus compensation of public sector employees. 
Private compensation per employee is deﬁ  ned 
as private compensation of employees divided 
by private sector employees (deﬁ   ned as total 
employment minus public sector employees 
minus self-employed persons).
Total compensation of employees in the 
government sector is deﬁ   ned as the total 
remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an 
employer to an employee in return for work done 
by the latter during the accounting period (in line 
with the European System of National Accounts 
(ESA95) methodology). EU Member States do 
not yet report standardised employment ﬁ  gures 
to Eurostat for the general government sector. 
Thus, it is necessary to resort to national sources, 
raising concerns over the homogeneity of data. 
The ﬁ  gures referred to in this paper are taken 
from the OECD database that presents the best 
choice as regards cross-country availability and 
homogeneity of data in this respect. Since the 
most recent vintages of the OECD Economic 
Outlook do not report public employment 
ﬁ   gures for Germany, Greece and Austria, 
the latest available data (referring to the spring 
2007 vintage) are used for these countries. For 
statistical issues regarding the deﬁ  nition  of 
government employment see OECD (1997).
For the annual data study in Section 4, wages, 
compensation of employees and compensation 
per employee are considered in both nominal 
and real terms. Given that deﬂ  ators have been 
pointed out as a source of disparity of results in 
the empirical literature on cyclicality of wages 
(Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995)), two different 
indices are used to deﬂ  ate nominal wages, namely 
the private consumption deﬂ  ator and the GDP 
deﬂ  ator. Real ﬁ  scal variables have been computed 
using the private consumption deﬂ  ator.
As for the intra-annual data study in Section 4, 
the European System of Accounts (ESA 95) 
provides only limited published time series 
and/or time coverage on public sector wages 
and employment. Eurostat recently started to 
disseminate quarterly series of compensation of 33
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government sector employees fully consistent 
with the existing annual ﬁ   gures (see the 
discussion in Pedregal and Pérez (2009)). 
Nevertheless, the starting point of these series 
is relatively short, ranging for the countries in 
question from the ﬁ  rst quarter of 1991 in the 
case of France to the ﬁ  rst quarter of 1999 in the 
cases of Germany and Italy. At the same time, 
the ESA 95 framework provides related quarterly 
series under the heading “Compensation of 
employees in other services”, the basis of 
which is compensation in non-market services 
whose main part is the government sector. 
This information can be used as an indication 
of the target concept of “general government 
compensation of employees”. Furthermore, 
it is possible to obtain monthly and quarterly 
information on personnel expenditures by some 
sub-sectors of the general government sector, 
typically the central or federal government 
sectors. For government employment, the OECD 
only publishes interpolated series on a quarterly 
basis, which seem to be based on mechanical 
interpolation procedures. Nevertheless, as in the 
case of compensation of government employees, 
it is possible to resort to ESA 95 ﬁ  gures  on 
“employment in other services”, the bulk of 
which are related to government activities. 
To the greatest extent possible, ofﬁ  cial 
information is used in this paper, especially as 
regards recently available quarterly series on 
employee compensation. Given the limitations 
of the information available, extensive use 
is made of available partial information, in 
particular related to non-market services. To use 
all this information in the most efﬁ  cient way, 
mixed-frequency time series models have 
been set up. These models allow for the fact 
that Eurostat does not provide seasonally 
adjusted series for newly available government 
sector variables to be addressed; the series are 
seasonally adjusted within the selected time 
series models. Finally, whole economy unit 
labour cost data are provided by Eurostat.34
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Chart 14 Individual country studies into wage leadership (cont’d)
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Empirical method
Empirical results
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1993-2006, Romania/Granger 








Bemmels and Zaidi (1999) 1973-83, Canada/Granger 






1) A Granger causality test is a technique for determining whether one time series is useful in forecasting another. A time series Y 
(e.g. private sector wages) is said to Granger-cause X (public sector wages) if it can be shown (and with lagged values of X also known) 
that those Y values provide statistically signiﬁ  cant information about future values of X.
2) A vector error correction (VEC) model is an econometric technique capturing the evolution and interdependencies between multiple 
time series (i.e. a vector auto regression or VAR) with an error correction feature. This feature means the short-run dynamics of the 
relationship between the variables depend on the deviation of the current state of the relationship from its long-run state.
3) Weak exogeneity refers to whether a variable can be considered as given, or whether it depends on other variables. If two variables 
X (e.g. private sector wages) and Y (public sector wages) are cointegrated (i.e. there is a long-run relationship or co-movement between 
them), and if X is weakly exogenous while Y is not, then Y adjusts to changes in X in order to maintain the long-run equilibrium. In this 
case, X is the “leader” and Y is the “follower”.36
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Table 8 Institutional determinants of public wage leadership 
















OECD labour market indicators
1) Index of bargaining coordination  0.231 -0.083 0.167 -0.255 0.125
[2.73]** [0.66] [1.07] [1.37] [0.71]
2) Index of bargaining centralisation -0.022
[0.26]
3) Employment protection legislation -0.318 -0.838 -1.24 -0.929 -0.873
[3.16]** [4.97]** [5.25]** [3.61]** [3.77]**
4) Union membership/employment 0.003 0.022 0.011 0.026 0.02
[1.33] [3.60]** [1.59] [2.72]** [2.52]*
Product market regulation index
5) Product market regulation index 0.434 1.119 1.857 1.309 1.112
[1.76] [3.84]** [4.39]** [3.22]** [2.58]**
Other control variables
6) KOF index of globalisation -0.011 -0.002 -0.005 0 -0.006
[2.85]** [0.49] [1.05] [0.05] [0.82]
7) Public employment ratio 5.645
[2.47]*
Wage Dynamic Network variables










































































Number of observations (maximum possible 432) 360 360 360 180 180
Sources: Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht (2008). 
Notes: Robust z statistics in brackets: * signiﬁ  cant at 5%; ** signiﬁ  cant at 1%. The estimated coefﬁ  cients shown in this table yield 
the marginal effect of a change in independent variables on the probability of public wage causation. The estimations include method 
dummies and deﬂ  ator dummies in columns 1 and 2. 37
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